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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING
NON-SCHEDULE PARTIAL DISABILITY CLAIMS
UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
JAMES i. RED*

Look in on any workmen's compensation hearing in South
Carolina and chances are high that you would observe an
inquiry for determining the "nature and extent of disability."
A typical hearing involves an issue on post-injury residual
consequences which add up to less than total disability; such
as low back symptoms, post concussion (head) syndrome,
stiff neck, hernia, myocardial infarction, arthritic joint disease, pain or other general disabling conditions. This type of
claim in workmen's compensation is referred to as non-schedule1 partial disability. The purpose of such a hearing is to
2
determine "disability" within the meaning of the statute
as applied to certain factors established in the evidence.
Added importance is attached to this subject due to its frequency as a basis for disputed claims. In the field of workmen's compensation this is for the courts and authorities, 3
as well as the administrative adjudicators and experienced
compensation lawyers, a most difficult area with intricate
problems, both of proof and proper application of the statute
for accomplishing legislative intentions.
Disability as defined by the statute :4
* * * means incapacity because of injury to earn the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of
injury in the same or any other employment.
*Member, Employee's Compensation Appeals Board, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. Formerly a member of the S. C.
Industrial Commission and Past President of International Association
of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions.
1. Specific limited quasi-indemnity in accordance with a schedule of
specific losses is provided for loss, or loss of use, of certain members of
the body-fingers, toes, hand, foot, arm, leg, eye (vision), loss of hearing-and is determined directly and solely by the degree of physical loss
or impairment of such a member. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952 § 72-153.
2. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 72-10 and 72-152.
3. 12 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 55 (1953); SOMiMERS AND SOMERS,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 72, 73, 74 (1954).
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-10. All Code sections
cited in the body of the article have reference to the CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952.
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In determining compensation for partial disability, § 72-152
states that the employer shall pay the injured employee during
partial disability:
a weekly compensation equal to 60 percent of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury
and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn
thereafter * * *. (Emphasis added.)
This same provision appears in most workmen's compensation acts. Able to earn and thereafter are key words, the interpretation of which has given rise to conflicting legal concepts necessitating resolution by the court of last resort
in many jurisdictions. The phrase able to earn appearing
similarly in most workmen's compensation laws has been
construed by the several courts and authorities as capacity
to earn. Determining post-injury capacity to earn has proved
to be a difficult problem. Generally one of two criteria has
been applied: (1) post-injury wages received, or (2) physical
impairment. However, several jurisdictions have established
a rule which rejects either (cases cited in footnotes 25, 26 and
29) ; and the South Carolina law on this subject seems to be
developing towards a rule recognizing that either criteria
in a particular case may be insufficient.
As early as 1939 the South Carolina Supreme Court, in
Manning v. Gossett Mills, et al.,6 stated in construing §§ 72-10
and 72-152:
The criterion of the right of claimant to compensation
under the act is this: Has his injury lessened his earning
capacity and deprived him in whole or in part of the
power to obtain employment? (Emphasis added.)
This principle was stated again by the court in Stone v. Ware
Shoals Mfg. Co., et al.,7 Burnette v. Startex Mills, et al.,8 and
Jewell v. R. B. Pond Co., et al.9
After the 1941 amendment 0 which made serious bodily
5. For discussion and cases see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 4 (1956); 5 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 105 (1950); 6 NACCA
LAW JOURNAL 90, 102 (1950); 12 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 56-58 (1953);
13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 120, 121 (1954).
6. 192 S. C. 262, 6 S. E. 2d 256 (1939).
7. 192 S. C. 459, 7 S. E. 2d 226 (1940).
8. 195 S. C. 118, 10 S. E. 2d 164 (1940).
9. 198 S. C. 86, 15 S. E. 2d 684 (1941).
10. 42 Statutes, p. 221, 1941, now, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952 § 72-153.
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disfigurement compensable irrespective of earning capacity,
the Court stated in Ingle v. Dunean Mills:"
Workmen's compensation, except specific benefits and
that allowed for disfigurement under present law, is for
loss or impairment of capacity to obtain employment and
earn wages. (Emphasis added.)
No fault can be found with this principle as stated by the
Court but it did not answer the ever-present question of
what factor, or factors, are material and should be considered
in reaching a determination of capacity to earn. But an answer was soon forthcoming.
In 1945 the Court cited §§ 72-10 and 72-152 again for construction for decision in Parrottv. Barfield Used Parts Co.,
et al.12 This was a landmark decision. Non-schedule disability claims have been settled with administrative approval
and adjudicated for more than a decade by the rule enunciated
in this case. Although the employee (Parrott) testified he
suffered some physical impairment,the Court considered that
the Industrial Commission based a finding of 20 percent permanent [partial] disability solely upon medical opinion:
* * * the claimant had suffered "20 or 25 percent" disability * * *

The employee's post-injury earnings (for the limited period in
question) were greater than his pre-injury average weekly
wages. The Court held:
Medical opinion as to the extent of disability can have no
probative value as against actual earnings.
The Court made it clear that it was error as a matter of law
under these circumstances summarily to equate a medical
percentage rating as disability. In arriving at this decision
the Court did not look beyond the fact of post-injury earnings as determinative of capacity to earn, even though there
were other facts in the record seeming to bear on the issue.
Apparently, the Court was convinced that the Industrial
Commission did not include these other facts as a basis for
its findings. In considering these statutory provisions, the
Court concerned itself properly in announcing that:
the Workmen's Compensation Act was not intended to
provide any award for pain and suffering as such or
11. 204 S. C. 505, 30 S. E. 2d 301 (1944).

12. 206 S. C. 381, 34 S. E. 2d 802 (1945).
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for any of the other elements of damages recoverable
in an ordinary action for personal injuries.
but went on to say:
** except to the extent that the employee had sustailned
an injury resulting in the diminution of his earnings
(Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that in this concluding phrase stating the
compensable criterion, no reference is made to capacity to
earn. Earnings were accepted as controlling of capacity to
earn; and this has been generally understood to mean wages
received.
Since 1945 the Parrott case has been cited and applied
many times in workmen's compensation cases as authority
for the equation that actual wages received equals capacity
to earn. For purposes of administration of the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Law, Parrotthas been applied as
meaning that post-injury wages received measured against
pre-injury average weekly wages, constituted the yardstick
of non-schedule disability and all other factors had no probative value. Application of this rule in some cases has led to
unjust results. Under Parrottan employee having an injurycaused physical impairment coupled with post-injury wages at
least equal to his average weekly wages can receive no award,
unless within 12 months from the last payment of compensation (which usually is for temporary loss of wages during
the healing period) his impairment results in some wage
loss; and after the 12 months his case is dead forever, 13
even if the physical impairment at some time after the 12
months should then reflect loss of wage-earning capacity as
measured by the concept of some partial or total diminution
of wages.
In a 1947 decision, after citing §§ 72-10, 72-151 and 72-152,
the Court restated the principle that the object of the Workmen's Compensation Act, with the exceptions stated in Ingle,
supra, is to compensate for loss of capacity to earn. 14
The Court's next opportunity for interpretation of §§ 72-10
and 72-151, came in 1954 in the case of Keeter v. Clifton Mfg.
Co.15 This employee, after the healing period, was found to
13. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-359.
14. Dameron v. Spartan Mills, et al., 211 S. C. 217, 44 S. E. 2d 465
(1947).
15. 225 S. C. 389, 82 S.E. 2d 520 (1954).
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have a 25 percent physical impairment to the body as a whole.
After returning to the same work, his post-injury earnings
were equal to his pre-injury average weekly wages. An award
was rendered by the Industrial Commission providing payment for partial disability compensation when and if Keeter's
physical impairment manifested itself in a loss of wages at
any time during the period of 300 weeks (the maximum
period allowed by the statute). This award was reversed by
the Circuit Court on the ground there was no present loss of
earnings, and that the Industrial Commission was without
authority to make an anticipatory finding. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, appellant's attorney suggested to the Court
that post-injury earnings equal to pre-injury average weekly
wages are not conclusive of non-impairment of capacity, but
at most create a presumption of such non-impairment which
may be overcome by other evidence showing that post-injury
wages received by an employee are not actually earned. The
Court showed its interest in this concept. Although not necessary for decision in the case, it stated:
A number of circumstances are called to our attention
as demonstrating the unreliability of post-injury earnings as a fair criterion of earning capacity in every case.
This is an interesting question ** ** (Emphasis added.)
The Court went on to point out that:
* * * The Industrial Commission has not found as a
fact that claimant has suffered a diminution in his capacity to earn the wages which he was receiving at the
time of his injury, and there is no showing that the compensation [wages] now paid him does not accurately reflect his earning capacity.
The Court concluded on the evidence of that case record and
the findings of the Industrial Commission that there was no
diminution in earning capacity and consequently Keeter was
not entitled to partial disability compensation; and as to the
nature of the award, the Court held:
The Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction
over its awards, but its awards are final except for review, and the Commission could not by undertaking to
retain jurisdiction for 300 weeks pending future developments, circumvent the limitation of 12 months within
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which an award may be reviewed for change of conditions.16
The language of the decision suggests that factors other than
wages received might affect capacity to earn and that the door
is open for the Industrial Commission and the Circuit Court
so to consider; and that the Supreme Court itself will so consider upon a proper record and findings. By its dictum the
Court repeated the rule laid down in Parrott. However, it
went further to say by implication that the post-injury wages
received shall constitute the measurement of capacity to earn
only where there is no showing to the contrary by other factors. The burden of so showing rests on the moving party
which may be either the defendant or the claimant depending
upon who seeks relief by overriding the operation of the
Parrottrule.
Some light may be shed on this subject by referring to
Utica-Mohawk Mills, et al., v. Curtis Orr.17 Although the
Court's decision contains no rule affecting determination of
non-schedule disability, it concerned itself with the particular
manner in which the compensation award was made for a
non-schedule disability. This decision was on an action
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act.' 8 The Court's
construction of the partial disability provision 9 dealt only
with the terms governing the method of mathematical computation of compensation payable which are not applied until
partial disability has been determined. The Court had before
it for construction an unappealed award of compensation
rendered by the Industrial Commission, whidh found that Orr,
although with total loss of wages, had only a 30 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and it was apparent to the Court that this finding was based on a medical
percentage rating. The Court was careful that its decision on
a different issue did not reflect approval of the award. It
stated:
As noted at the outset and now repeated for emphasis,
there was no appeal from the award of the Commission
and the correctness of it is not in question in this proceeding * * *.
16. Keetner v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 225 S. C. 389, 82 S. E. 2d 520 (1954)

at syllabus 3.

17. 227 S. C. 226, 87 S. E. 2d 587 (1955).
18. CODE oF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2001 et seq.
19. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-152.
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Based on the Court's caution and that part of the award at
which its concern was directed, the inference is taken that
the Court would not approve as a matter of law a summary
equating of a medical rating of physical impairment as partial
disability in the face of the accompanying fact that the claimant was earning no wages.
Viewing the Court's holding in Parrott,supra,
Medical opinions as to the extent of disability can have
no probative value as against actual earnings
in the light of the implications in the Court's attitude in Orr,
supra, it follows that under the present state of the law, medical opinion as to the extent of disability of an existing injurycaused impairment cannot control when the evidence also
establishes the fact of no earnings. But should an award for
total disability then be issued? This would be the effect of
applying the other end of the stick of logic employed by the
Court in Parrott, or stated differently, it is how that twoedged sword cuts in the other direction.
A rule seemingly converse to Parrotthas been applied in
cases even where the employee received some wages. A recent
decision 20 of the South Carolina Court written by the very
able Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stukes, is most helpful in understanding the state of the law on this subject. The employee, a general laborer, suffered an injury-caused collapsed
lung. Following recovery his injured lung was threatened
with re-collapse upon exertion. Although after injury he
worked for a brief period at light work earning some wages,
his award for total disability was sustained by the Court,
which said:
Disability is a relative term and must be related to the
occupation of the claimant. Here he is disabled to perform common labor and cannot obtain employment at
such; and he is not qualified by training or experience
for any other.
The Court held that this evidence of the employee's employability was sufficient to support the finding of total disability,
by stating:
* * * the extent of an injured workman's disability is a

question of fact for determination by the commission and
20. Colvin v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 227 S. C. 465, 88 S. E. 2d
581 (1955).
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will not be reversed if it is supported by competent evidence.
This decision quoted with favor decisions of other jurisdictions where total disability awards were sustained, even
though the employee after injury was able to earn some wages
at odd jobs or occasional work.2 1 In concluding, the South
Carolina Supreme Court said:
We do not need in this case to go as far as the two last
cited authorities because the respondent is unable to follow his occupation as a laborer and is unemployed; and
the result here does not impinge upon the rule of our
statute and decisions that, quoting, "the disability is to
be measured by the employee's capacity or incapacity to
earn the wages which he was receiving at the time of his
injury. Loss of earning capacity is the criterion." Keeter
v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 225 S. C. 389; 82 S. E. 2d 520.
A holding in a recent Federal decision is similar. In the
case of Great American Indemnity Co. v. SegaI2 2 it was
stated:
Continuing employment without impairment of earnings
after an injury does not preclude a finding of total disability. Disability is total when the injured employee
is no longer able to secure and retain employment as
prior to the injury, and the claimant should not be deprived of her compensation just because the employer,
out of the goodness of his heart, has kept her on the
payroll allowing her to do light work.
The NACCA Law Journal editor stated in commenting on

this case :221
In support of its sound conclusion, the court quotes from
Mabry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir.
1952), noted in 10 NACCA Law Journal 111: "Pinched
by poverty, beset by adversity, driven by necessity, one
may work to keep the wolf away from the door though
not physically able to work; and . . .the fact that the
woman worked to earn her living did not prevent a jury
from finding.., that she was totally and permanently
disabled even while working.
21. Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N. W. 2d 433
(1950); Texas Indm. Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 228 S. W. 2d 348 (Tex. 1950).

22. 229 F. 2d 845 (5th Cir. 1956).
22a. 18 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 124 (1956).
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Accord, American General Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 287 S. W.
2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) final affirmance of award
in psychic injury case reported in 14 NACCA Law Journal 47 and 16 id. 67; Roling v. Hatten & Davis Lumber
Co., 85 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1956), total permanent proper
on new finding increasing disability retroactive in effect
to original date of injury, despite lack of appeal from
previous order fixing disability at 50 %.
In view of the present state of the problem concerning determination of non-schedule disability, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's language in the recent cases of Keeter, Orr,
and Colvin, and the trend as seen by the decisions in other
jurisdictions, lawyers representing either claimants or defendants must concern themselves with proof of facts bearing on wage-earning capacity in addition to post-injury wages
and physical impairment. Wages are compelling evidence of
capacity to earn but wages are subject to influences of economic fluctuations, particularly inflation, sympathy of employers, overtime work, unwillingness to work regularly, and
other factors, and therefore are unreliable as conclusive evidence. Percentage of physical impairment is strong evidence,
but, although the impairment is the same in different individuals, it may produce differing losses of capacity to earn, depending on age, occupation, training, adaptability for retraining and other factors and, therefore, is unreliable as conclusive evidence.
It should not necessarily follow as a fact nor as law in construing section 72-151 (total disability) or section 72-152
(partial disability) that:
(1) wages received equals capacity to earn, nor
(2) physical impairment equals capacity to earn.
Legislative intent clearly seen in § 72-152, requires the
comparing of two factors for determining compensation payable for non-schedule partial disability:
(1) pre-injury average weekly wages, which is constant,
and
(2) post-injury capacity to earn, which although constant, may be influenced by factors which are not
constant.
Factor (1) affords very little difficulty of proof. To determine whether an employee is incapacitated for work as re-

Published by Scholar Commons, 1957

9

South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1957], Art.
3
[Vol.
CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
SOUTH

9

sult of injury, it is necessary to ascertain what capacity for
work he had before he sustained the injury and then to see
to what extent, if any, that capacity has diminished as the
result of the injury. So, the first of these two factors for
proof is pre-injury average weekly wages which the legislature intended to stand as the sole measurement of the employee's pre-injury capacity to earn. This is usually very
simple to establish in a manner as outlined by the statute, 23
and once established this factor remains constant. Establishing factor (2) is a difficult problem of proof. For comparison, factors (1) and (2) must be placed on the same economic
level. This can best be done by bringing together all material
facts within a reasonable time following the healing period,
and pinning them down as near as possible to the same circumstances. 24 In establishing factor (2) care should be taken
in comparing post-injury wages received with pre-injury average weekly wages. Between these two, if there has been a
lapse of time during which wage fluctuations occurred, the
comparison without adjustment is inaccurate as an index to
capacity to earn.
In making that comparison, therefore, it is necessary to
test present post-injury wages with the wages which the
claimant would presently be earning in his old job were it
not for the injury, which in effect is placing the two economic
factors on the same lavel 25 and discounting the variable wage
fluctuation caused by unrelated influences.
Although capacity to earn and not wages received is
the proper test, an employee's actual wages may constitute compelling evidence of his capacity to earn and in
a proper case may be used as a yardstick in determining
26
an injured employee's diminished earning capacity.
However,
The length of any yardstick used, if inequities and injustices are to be prevented, must remain constant. It
must follow then that wages received two, five, or ten
years after an employee has sustained an injury and
during which period changes in business conditions have
23. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-4.
24. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 4-5, 14-15 (1956);
Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P. 2d 230 (1951).
25. Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P. 2d 230

(1951).
26. Albert C. Shadrick, 5 ECAB 376 (1953)

(Employee's Compensa-

tion Appeals Board, U. S. Department of Labor).
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caused wages to double due to a business boom or to be
cut in half due to a depression cannot be used as a conclusive factor in determining a claimant's diminished
27
wage-earning capacity after he has been injured.
The statute does not state that compensation is to be based
upon the difference between an employee's average weekly
wages and whatever variable dollar income he might have
in the future. It provides for the payment of compensation in
non-schedule partial disability cases upon the basis of the
impairment in the employee's capacity to earn wages and not
upon actual wage loss as such nor upon physical impairment
as such. Once established, post-injury earning capacity is
subject to change only upon a showing of change in the claimant's physical condition or other statutory ground with the
2S
burden of proof resting on the party seeking relief.
Several courts have held that where there is evidence other
than the facts pertaining to post-injury wages and physical
impairment bearing on post-injury wage-earning capacity
it is reversible error to base a determination on the premise
that non-schedule partial disability compensation is (1) payable according to the degree of physical impairment, or (2)
payable according to wage loss, or (3) not payable when there
is no wage loss.29 It is a great convenience merely to equate
wages received or a physician's percentage of physical impairment as wage-earning capacity, but either basis constitutes
a false assumption of being a just equation in the face of the
fact that necessary correlation of all material facts is neglected thereby. The information contained in either alone is
insufficient; and to be adequate must be supplemented by any
other available material evidence.
A very appropriate comment as to the unreliability of
wages received as the sole basis for determining wage-earning
27. Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P. 2d 230
(1951).

28. J. A. Foust Coal Co. v. Messer, 195 Va. 762, 80 S. E. 2d 533
(1954).

29. Miles v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 208, 240 P. 2d 171
(1952); Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Hadley, 70 Ariz. 179, 218 P. 2d 488
(1950); Ball v. Mann, 75 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1954); Davis v. C. F. Braun
& Co., 170 Kan. 177, 223 P. 2d 958 (1950); Strother v. Standard Ace.
Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 484 (La. 1953); King v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
92 So. 2d 209 (Miss. 1957); Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co.,
127 Mont. 211, 259 P. 2d 340 (1953); Desrosiers v. Dionne Bros. Furniture, 98 N. H. 424, 101 A. 2d 775 (1953); J. A. Foust Coal Co. v. Messer,
195 Va. 762, 80 S. E. 2d 533 (1954); Walk v. State Compensation
Comm'r., 134 W. Va. 223, 58 S. E. 2d 791 (1950).
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capacity is found in 12 NACCA LAW JOURNAL, pages 56-57:
To use the actual difference between the old and new
wage may be unfair to an insurer as well as to an employee. For example, an employee previously earning
$60 accepts a $35 job after the injury, although actually
capable of earning $50 on another job. In a state like
Massachusetts, where he gets the entire difference in
partial compensation from the insurer, the insurer would
be compelled to pay $25 partial rather than $10 if "actual" wages were to control. Yet it has long been held
that "able" to earn may be more than "actually" earning.
Smith v. Tonawanda Paper Co., 238 A. D. 690, 266 N. Y.
S. 160 (1933). Lavallee's Case, 277 Mass. 538, 179 N. E.
214 (1931)-may give higher earning capacity than
actual wages received, citing Durney's Case, 222 Mass.
461 (1916), where actual earnings were $13.20, but "he
was able to earn $15 a week, notwithstanding his injuries." (Italics supplied.)
Conversely, the injury may so cripple an employee that
while "not able to earn" his old wage, i. e., his earning
ability or capacity may be seriously impaired, yet for
some unusual reason an employer may actually pay him
as much or more than before. In such a situation earning capacity, not actual wages, governs. The earning
capacity may be less than the actual wages and hence
disability compensation may be due. In each of the following situations higher actual post-injury wages were
held not to bar disability compensation: (1) where part
of the post-injury wages were a gift or out of sympathy
for the claimant (Shaw's Case, 247 Mass. 157, 141 N. E.
858 (1923), and cases in notes 39-41, 2 Larson's Work'men's Compensation Law, p. 16) ; or (2) were due to an
increase in general wage levels since the time of accident
(Whyte v. Industrial Commission, 71 Ariz. 338, 227
P. 2d 230 (1951), 7 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 106, and cases
cited in 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 13,
note 29) ; or (3) were due to the claimant's greater maturity or training (Ludwickson v. Central States Elec.
Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N. W. 2d 65 (1942)) ; or (4) were
due to working longer hours (cf. Devlin v. Iron Works
Creek Construction Corp., 164 Pa. Super. 481, 66 A. 2d
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221 (1949)) ; or (5) were due to other temporary or unpredictable reasons making post-injury wages unreliable.
A most profound statement contained in a decision of the
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, United States Department of Labor, in Fred Foster,30 shows clearly one of the
reasons why physical impairment does not represent wageearning capacity and why medical ratings alone should not
be relied upon for determining physical impairment.
Physician's percentages at the best are mere rough individual estimates, as to which any reasonable unanimity
of opinion cannot be expected * * * There is nothing scientific in the "percentages" estimate (often it reflects
a "hard" or "soft" attitude on the part of the estimator),
nor is there any recognizable table from which to derive
the percentages. This leaves the whole matter of such
percentages to great chance or hazard, and for this reason alone of doubtful value as the sole criterion upon
which to base loss of wage-earning capacity. The most
important object in the administration of any workmen's
compensation law is to make certain that the law is properly and fairly applied as intended by the legislature. A
practice which does not accord with law cannot be accepted merely because it affords administrative convenience. It may involve more difficulty to obtain evidence
bearing upon the extent to which an injury impairs wageearning capacity than merely to choose some such "percentage," but the fact of any such greater difficulty does
not justify a departure from the requirement of the law,
nor warrant the acceptance of an inherently invalid principle.
Assuming that all individuals with a given percentage of
physical impairment have the same loss of wage-earning capacity due to common physical structures is to ignore other
facts such as age, training, occupation, etc., which cause differing economic consequences to different persons. A laborer
with a 25 percent physical impairment resulting from a back
injury as a matter of fact might well lose a greater percentage
of his capacity to earn than 25 percent, but to a person with a
sedentary job the same impairment might result in no loss of
earning capacity. Any other view overlooks realities.
30. 1 ECAB 21, 24 (1947) (Employee's Compensation Appeals Board,
U. S. Department of Labor).
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Larson in his exhaustive work, Workmen's Compensation
Law,3 1 referring to wage-loss versus medical rating in determining disability, says:
Compensable disability is inability, as the result of a
work-connected injury, to perform or obtain work suitable to the claimant's qualifications and training. The
degree of disability depends on impairment of earning
capacity, which in turn is presumptively determined by
comparing pre-injury earnings with post-injury earning
ability. The presumption may, however, be rebutted by
showing that post-injury earnings do not accurately reflect claimant's true earning power.
The proper balancing of the medical and the wage loss
factors is * * * the essence of the "disability" problem in
workmen's compensation.
He goes on to state that it is in
the two fields of non-schedule partial disability and total
permanent disability which occasions controversy because
of the constant interplay of medical and wage-loss
factors.
Mr. Larson, in discussing earning capacity, states:
It obviously does not mean actual earning, since the
legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the
post-injury earnings factor. * * * The concept of wages
he "is able" to earn cannot mean definite actual wages
alone, especially in the absence of a fixed period of time
within which post-injury wages are to be taken as controlling.
In discussing the "thereafter" period for ascertaining postinjury earnings as the determinative factor, this author says:
An award must be made now and paid now to do the
claimant any good.
Therefore he suggests:
The only possible solution is to make the best possible
estimate of future impairments, on the strength not
only of actual post-injury earnings but of any other
available clues.
31. 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 1-13 (1956); for full
discussion of non-schedule partial disability see pages 1-58.
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He cautions that post-injury earnings may be unreliable,
due to a number of things: increase in general wage
levels since the time of accident; claimant's own greater
maturity or training; longer hours worked by claimant
after the accident; payment of wages disproportionate to
capacity out of sympathy to claimant and the temporary
and unpredictable character of post-injury earnings..
Mr. Larson points out that,
The ultimate objective of the disability test is, by discounting these variables, to determine the wage that
would have been paid in the open labor market under
normal employment conditions to claimant as injured,
taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant's age and
state of training as of exactly the same period used for
calculating actual wages earned before the injury. Only
by the elimination of all variables except the injury itself
can a reasonably accurate estimate be made of the impairment of earning capacity to be attributed to that
injury.
He concludes, saying,
By its nature permanent partial loss of earning capacity
must be always a prediction about the indefinite future.
Horovitz states the rule, with supporting authorities, as follows:
Actual wages earned do not necessarily establish an employee's earning capacity. It is within the province of
the trier of facts to find the amount which he actually
earned represented what he "was able" to earn, but evidence of a greater earning capacity may not be excluded,
nor of a lesser, i. e., that part of his so-called wages
32
was a gratuity or gift.
Any whole body physical impairment, more than slight,
should raise a presumption of fact of some loss of wage-earning capacity. It is difficult to accept the reasoning that the
legislature intended that material physical impairment would
not constitute some loss of wage-earning capacity even in the
face of post-injury wages equal to pre-injury wages. If Parrott and Keeter truly represent the fully crystallized state of
the law on this subject, legislative changes are necessary in
order to harmonize this part of the workmen's compensation
law with its overall intents and purposes established as pub32. HORoVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 276 (1944).
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lic policy by the legislature. Such changes in the law could be
either:
1. To abolish the twelve months' limitation for review
of an award so a claimant may be followed for life
or to extend the period so far into the future that
compensation can assuredly be awarded when and if
physical impairment manifests itself in lost wages; or
2. To add a conclusive presumption clause to the nonschedule disability section that loss of wage-earning
capacity shall be equal at least to the same degree of
whole body physical impairment, but shall not constitute a bar to proof of a greater loss of wage-earning
capacity; or
3. To extend the coverage in the schedule for indemnity
awards.
Schedule disability compensation is limited quasi-indenmity
grafted on to workmen's compensation. A schedule of disabilities as basis for money awards regardless of wages or
capacity to earn came into being for a purpose. It became
apparent in the early administration of workmen's compensation laws that there were some injury-caused physical losses
not resulting in any wage-loss nor affecting earning capacity,
consequently no compensation was payable. The view developed that to allow this was poor public policy. Historically,
in theory, these schedules of disabilities in workmen's compensation were presumptively tied to wage-earning capacity. 33
It was further presumed that each individual with the same
physical impairment or anatomical loss to a scheduled member
would have the same resulting loss of earning capacity for
the same period of time. The resulting money payment is,
of course, what the legislature intended but it is nonsense to
accept in fact that this theory is correct in the practical affairs of workmen in our industrial society.3 4 These schedules
33. SOMMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 71-73 (1954).
34. There has never been a survey in any jurisdiction for determining
if in reality these schedule disabilities have any relationship to the arbitrary fixed periods of presumptive loss of wage-earning capacity. The
outstanding workmen's compensation authority, Dr. Herman E. Somers,
Chairman of the Political Science Department, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania, has confirmed this in person to the writer and said
further his studies revealed these schedules as indemnity payments established as a matter of public policy. This has also been confirmed to the

writer by many state administrators. If this were not so there would be

efforts to make such a survey for purposes of altering or abolishing the

schedules.
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on their face are nothing but a list of limited quasi-indemnities in lieu of compensation which were enacted by the legislature as public policy to make certain that employees having
any enumerated loss would surely be indemnified to a limited
extent for that loss per se. Certain risks to the employee's
receiving an award in the absence of such a schedule must
have been apparent to the legislators. For example, not being able to prove that an anatomical loss resulted in wage
loss or loss of wage-earning capacity; or, after waiting a long
indefinite period for the anatomical loss to show up in a
wage loss, going uncompensated due to some statutory cut-off
period.
Under this so-called view of presumptive loss of wageearning capacity, such loss is determined by the degree of
anatomical loss or physical impairment (as found by the adjudicator measured against industrial utility of the affected
member) .35 So, in the schedules by theorizing we have, in
effect, the equation that physical impairment equals loss of
wage-earning capacity for the number of weeks as specified.
With this as an easy and working tool in the very great number of schedule disability claims, it became convenient to employ the same tool in handling non-schedule disability claims.
The occurrence of this is understandable but as to non-schedule disability, the legislature deliberately chose the criterion
of loss of wage-earning capacity not physical impairment as
the basis of entitlement to compensation and no presumption
as to what constitutes loss of wage-earning capacity was
written into the non-schedule disability statute. This must
be determined as all other facts by the adjudicator.
Accepting, therefore, that neither post-injury wages nor
physical impairment as such represents wage-earning capacity, and that other additional facts are needed for doing justice as intended by the legislature, certain questions arise.
What are these other facts or clues?, How are they proved?
When proved, what formula applies for correlation of "other
facts" with the facts of physical impairment and post-injury
wages and the assessing of probative value to the parts and
to the whole? By way of preface to a discussion of answers
to these three questions, and repeating for emphasis, it should
be recognized on going into a compensation hearing on this
35. This is another problem area in workmen's compensation administration and in itself is a subject for a separate paper. For reference

see the rule on industrial loss of vision.
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subject that the word "disability", misused and abused at a
hearing, is likely to confuse the evidence and cause it to be
misleading. Often the word is used wrongly in view of the
specific meaning given it by statute and interpretation of the
South Carolina Supreme Court.
The disability in non-schedule disability claims is determined by the law and facts, that is, applying the evidence to
the statute. Finding "disability" is the conclusion sought.
This is the necessary decision solely for the adjudicator.
Therefore, great care should be exercised not to use the word
"disability" loosely when referring to the "injuries" or "impairments" in making the record. It should not be used as
compensation jargon nor in the sense of its common meaning
by the adjudicator, the lawyers, or witnesses. Using precise
terms in proper context affords a better basis for an objective and soundly reasoned evaluation of the evidence on the
question. Even medical witnesses, as experts giving opinion
evidence as to the extent of post-injury residual consequences,
should not use the word "disability." The most appropriate
term is physical impairment. Disability outside workmen's
compensation has a common meaning inclusive of physical
impairment; but disability has lost its common meaning by
virtue of the statute and where used in making the record
must be considered as meaning more than physical impairment.
What these other facts are, and how they are proved, are
related questions. Establishing the degree of causally related
physical impairment and post-injury wages, if any, is the
primary burden of proof. In addition, come the other facts as
clues to wage-earning capacity which may be elicited from the
usual witnesses in accordance with varying factual situations.
This cannot be spelled out. It is here that the ingenuity of
the lawyer is challenged in the preparation and presentation
of the appropriate evidence.
As recognized, the claimant and the medical experts are
the most important witnesses. Other witnesses may include
claimant's neighbors, associates, supervisors, past and present
employers and co-workers, and other lay persons who might
possess pertinent evidence concerning the "before" and
"after" state of the claimant's health and physical condition.
Efforts should be made to elicit testimony befitting the factual situation from the claimant and other lay witnesses con-
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cerning the claimant's "before" and "after" injury functional
efficiency as a physiological unit in an industrial society; 3 6
more particularly the post-injury physical condition with
which he must live " * * * as compared with a person of the
same age and sex whose physical and mental condition is
normal" ;37 claimant's age, occupational training, occupational
experience, occupational aptitude; wages earned before injury; wages he would now be earning in his old job were it
not for the injury; claimant's efforts and degree of success
in obtaining post-injury employment and post-injury wages
received; whether post-injury wages were comparable to
wages paid claimant before injury for same labor or presently
paid other employees for similar labor or whether affected
by other considerations or influences; whether the post-injury
wages came from some temporary or make-shift odd job or
occasional work as opposed to employment in one of the enduring substantial occupations in the community; whether
the post-injury labor marketed by the claimant enabled him
to be competitive on the labor market for an enduring type
job; employment opportunities available to such a person as
the claimant with the same remaining physical functional efficiency; and descriptions of whatever specific situations a
particular claimant must face in his work-a-day world.
In the matter of wage-earningcapacity evaluation, the medical expert's testimony primarily should concern opinion of
the claimant's physical impairment, i. e., his physical functional efficiency as a physiological unit in an industrial society. It is not for the medical witness, unless especially
qualified, to say what job the claimant could or could not perform since this is the province of the trier of the facts. The
medical witness' testimony should be restricted to his qualifications and the purpose for which he is called as a witness.
His opinion must be more than that the employee is "able to
do light work" or "not able to do laborious work." The medical witness can best help the trier of the facts by describing
factually the claimant's physical impairment in terms of limitation on physical functions; what physical activities claimant
is able or is not able to engage in, particularly weight lifting,
body and joint movements, bending, stooping, walking, stair
36. Heidel v. Wallace & Tiernan, Inc., 37 N. J. Super. 522, 117 A. 2d
678 (1955), aff'd 21 N. J. 335, 122 A. 2d 180 (1956); 18 NACCA LAW
JOURNAL 121 (1956).

37. Ibid.
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climbing, time endurance of working, standing, sitting, body
agility working around and under machinery, climbing and
using step-ladders, working overhead, fatigability, risk to
health or recurrence of disabling condition upon certain types
of exertion, activities, or exposure; pain, if any, accompanying physical function; and other helpful evidence as dictated
by a particular fact situation.
In addition to his opinion on these matters the medical
witness should outline, preparatory to his opinion, his findings upon medical examination of the claimant and all other
facts which he accepts as a predicate for his opinion. Where
the medical witness is answering hypothetical questions it
is especially essential that the trier of the facts understand
clearly what facts the medical witness accepted as a predicate
for his opinion. When the trier of the facts has made his
findings he must look to the facts upon which medical opinion
was predicated and, in accordance with their comparison in
material aspects with his findings, decide the probative value
of the medical opinion.
In the matter of wage-earning capacity evaluation, certain
other witnesses become important. Since it is essential to
know as much as possible about a particular community's
labor market as well as the claimant's employability, certain
lay persons such as employers, personnel and industrial relations directors, and others having a wide knowledge of the
labor market, could be expected to supply some evidence. But
more important than these are the job placement experts,
such as the specialists with the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (State Department of Education), the Employment
Service Division of the Employment Security Commission,
and others with private employment agencies. These impartial specialists are acquainted with the employment conditions
of their districts and could give reliable evidence on what
jobs, if any, are available to the claimant and the nature of
such jobs; and opinion as to what wages could be earned in a
particular community by a person with the claimant's physical impairment and background.
When all evidence is in it becomes the duty of the trier of
the facts to study the evidence, determine its probative value,
weigh the evidence, correlate the evidence, resolve the conflicts, and make findings. There is no precise formula which
can be spelled out for this purpose. When the facts proved
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supply more than one inference it is solely for the trier of the
facts to draw the inference in determining disability as in
determining all other facts. True he must consider all the
facts bearing on disability in weighing the evidence. In the
process he should look to what present facts show as to the
employee's capacity to obtain and perform work in some
enduring type of employment on the labor market, and what
present facts show as to the employee's capacity to satisfactorily and continuously perform such work on into the indefinite future. It is assumed in such cases that the trier of the
facts considered all of the facts in evidence unless there is
a showing to the contrary which must rest upon proof. This
manifestly would be shown should the trier of the facts base
a determination of non-schedule disability solely upon either
post-injury wages as such, or physical impairment as such,
without considering other material facts when they are of
record. Such a showing would also constitute a reversible
error as a matter of law. Otherwise, any finding by the trier
of the facts which is based upon competent evidence is conclusive.
The trier of facts must make a finding whether there
is or is not causally related whole body physical impairment
when that fact is in issue. When there is such physical impairment, he must proceed to find whether there is any resulting loss of wage-earning capacity. The rule may be stated
that this is presumptively determined by comparing postinjury wages with pre-injury average weekly wages, and that
the presumption is overcome only when other facts show that
post-injury wages do not fairly and reasonably represent
post-injury capacity to earn. Then the trier of the facts by
correlating all material facts, and according to whatever
formula persuades or gives him a conviction as a reasonable
man in the conduct of a serious affair, may make a finding
that the claimant presently has a wage-earning capacity of
"X" dollars. That, when compared to his pre-injury average
weekly wages, reveals whether there is any loss in his wageearning capacity. If there is such loss it is the measure of
non-schedule disability.
The best the Industrial Commission can do in these cases,
to paraphrase Mr. Larson, is to make a finding now on the
present wage-earning capacity of the claimant, which is a
prediction about the indefinite future and should be made on
the basis of all available clues.
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